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Stanley D. Weiss
First with Air Coach

During the 1950s, Stan Weiss, operator of a nonscheduled airline,
contrived to fashion an organization that came very close to revolutionizing the entire U .S. airline industry. The government agency
of the time; the Civil Ae;onautics Board, the powerful lobbies of the
established airlines, and even the Supreme Court itself, a ll combined to deny North American Airlines-Trans Ameri ca n Airlines
at the time of its demise-th e right to offer the American public th e
benefits of chea p air travel. As the first operator of cheap air services to the American public, Stan Weiss has a just claim to being
called the innovator of coach fares, and as such h e deserves an hon orable place in airline hi story.
Thirty years after Stan Weiss and his partners had been
regulated and legislated out of business, the principles for which
they battled endlessly through the machinery of the regulatory
agency and the courts w ere finally recognized as an essential feature of the American way of life , as legitimate principles that
shou ld be encoura ge d, not condemned. But Weiss was three decades ahead of his time a nd was pilloried for his actions. His was
the las t of the nonscheduled airlines to do any substantial bus iness for a decade.
But his influence on th e course of air tran spor t was cons iderable. Although many years were to pass before this b ecom e ev ident,
Stan Weiss and his associates had forced the authorities to review
the basic purposes for which the origina l air transport regulations
had been framed in 1938. This influence was particularly applicable
to the manner in which passenger fares should b e set. North Ameri83
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Stan Weiss was one of the
happy band offarmer airmen
who sought to enter the airline
business after World War II. He
introduced coach fares to the
American flying public, but his
North American Airlines was
thwarted by bureaucratic
machinations that would seem
ludicrous in the deregulated
airline world of today.

Douglas C-54s, and Consolidated B-24s across the treacherous terrain of the southwest China frontier.
Already m~rried, with two children, when the war ended, he
vowed that he would never go back to rolling pills again. He and
his family established their home at Long Beach, California, where
he had last been stationed, and it was here that Stan Weiss began
to think seriously about forming an airline. By this time he was not
obliged, as some of the postwar aspiring airline promoters were, to
depend heavily as a source of finance on the gratuity granted by
the armed forces on discharge. He had been thrifty during his war
service and had enhanced his bank balance with winnings at
poker, a favorite pastime in the China theater and one at which he
apparently excelled.
For his first venture he went into a precarious partnership with
Colonel Charles Sherman, another airline entrepreneur who flitted
across the nonscheduled airline scene, in one company or another,
for several years after World War IL Together they founded a company rejoicing in the name of the Fireball Air Express, which, because they intended to carry air freight, seemed appropriate at the
time. But before the company began to operate, they realized that
many returning veterans were loitering around Long Beach Airport,
seeking a ride eastward, and to carry them seemed only natural.
Thus, on January 17, 1946, Stan Weiss operated his first DC-3more precisely, a war-surplus C-4 7, converted for civilian use-from
Long Beach to New York via Kansas City and Chicago . This date
can, with some justification, be claimed as the inauguration day of
air coach service in the United States, or, for that matter, anywhere
in the world-although some British operators had undercut Imperial Airways during the 1930s.
Fireball Air Express may be said to have been born on December 4, 1945, when Weiss and Sherman made a down payment of
$3,000 each to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for two
Douglas C-47s. On December 17 they signed a Certificate of Fictitious Firm Name-as the official jargon insisted-and on the following day borrowed $18,000 from the Bank of America in Lona
Beach, at the same time applying to the Civil Aeronautics Authority (C.A.A.) for registration as an air carrier. A month later, they borrowed a further $32,000 from the Cherry/Anaheim Branch of the
Bank, mainly because the manager "liked the cut of Stan's uni-

can devised a system that was clearly superior to the out-of-date
methods of the scheduled airlines. No one who was connected with _
the airline industry in the United States during the critical period
of the mid 1950s has ever forgotten it, and many believe to this day
that both the company and the man did more than any other to pioneer low fares. Neither has been given full credit for the remarkable achievement.
Stanley D. Weiss (pronounced Weese) was born on June 8,
191 O, in Gotebo, Oklahoma, the son of the only pharmacist in town.
He attended high school in Gotebo but then went to live with his
mother in New York, where he received a degree in pharmacology
at Columbia University and worked as a pharmacist, among other
occupations, ·during the 1930s. He became interested in aviation,
learned to fly in 1937, and by the outbreak of World War II had
amassed several hundred hours of flying time.
Immediately after the Pearl H,a rbor incident in 1941, he
joined the Anny Air Corps, which became the U.S. Air Force, and
had a varied career. He was successively a flight instructor, a ferry
pilot, and a member of that exclusive breed of "hump" pilots in the
China-Burma-India (C.B.l.) theater, where he flew Curtiss C-46s,
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form." He must also have liked the cut of Stan's proposition, which
was to make airline history .
. .
In J946 the fate-tempting name of the a1~lme had been
changed to the more demure Standard Air Lmes, m keepmg wit~
the unplanned change from air freight to pass_e nger service, and 1t
was under this name that Weiss and James F1schgrun_d (Sherman
was no longer a partner) obtained a Letter of Reg1stra t10? from the
Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B) as a Large I~regular Carner._
Standard was not the only company m the transcontmenta l
nonscheduled airline business. There were several others, most of
which quickly ceased operations as soon as somethmg went
wrong-normally the inability to attract a stead~ flow of passengers or to keep the aircraft flying by a proper mam tenance schedule One of them, however, Viking Air Lines, was a fonmdable co'.n·.
fl ymg
·
DC -3s on the same transcontinental route and with
pet1tor,
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connections to Miami. Viking had also been found ed in 1945, by
Ross R. Hart and Jack B. Lewin, and was based at the Lockheed Air
Terminal at Burbank. Charging a transcontinental fare of only
$99.00, both airlines were beginning to tap a new passenger market-the nonbusiness people who could not normally afford the
fares being charged by all the scheduled airlines. Fares w ere rigidly set by the C.A.B. according to a mileage formula, which did
not vary among the domestic trunk carriers that were the fortunate
possessors of the grandfather certificates handed out in 1938. Competition in fares did not exist, in spite of the fact that the C.A .B. was
specifically charged with promoting it.
Then in 1948 the board took its first action to limit the activities of the precocious newcomers and applied what became known
as the 3 and 8 Rule. This meant that a nonscheduled Large Irregular
airline was permitted to fly only eight round-trip flights a month between any pair of cities in the U.S . and only three on certain highdensity routes-that is, all the best routes coveted by the scheduled
operators, some of them monopolies or near monopolies.
Neither Standard nor Viking flew strictly within the 3 and 8
Rule, and in 1949 the two companies merged to form a stronger airline, with more equipment and greater financial resources. Stan
Weiss and his then partners devised an ingenious stratagem to
evade the intentions of the C.A.B. restrictions without actual ly
breaking the law.
Early in 1949, Standard and Viking formed the North American Airlines agency. This was a ticketing organization that sold the
transcontinental air coach service to the public, although it was
not registered as an airline. The operating certificates, as Irregular
Carriers, were sti ll held by the original two companies. Weiss,
Fischgrund, Lewin, and Hart then acquired other Irregular Carrier
certificates: those of Twentieth Century Airlines, formed by Edward McAndrews; Trans-American Airways, formed by Mauri
Swidler; Trans-National Airlines; and Hemisphere Air Transport.
The combined fleet grew to a total of fourteen Douglas DC-3s
and a DC-4, initially leased late in 1949 from Stan Weiss's good
friend and fellow pioneer Robert W. Prescott, founder of the Flying
Tiger Line, until 1986 ,the preeminent all-cargo airline. Flying resumed, accompanied by some organized promotion, on a route from
Los Angeles to New York via Alburquerque, Kansas City, and Chicago. The DC-3s, fitted with twenty-eight austere seats, could not
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compete in comfort or speed with the pressurized Constellations
and DC-6s of the scheduled trunk lines such as American and T .W .A.,
but the North American fare was only $99.00 one way, substantially
lower than those of the trunk carriers. The public had a choice:
higher fares and comparative luxury or lower fares without the
frills. To the chagrin of the established airlines, railroads, and longdistance bus lines, the public flocked to North American Airlines.
The essential feature of the service was that it combined the
individual authorities of the _member companies in the North
American group, so that, by si·mple arithmetic, even under the 3
and 8 Rule, they could offer a daily service. Eight round -trip flights
a month need be mul tiplied only by four to produce thirty-two, ample for even the longer months. By cutting out the costly amenities
and carefully matching schedules to demand, North American was
able to sustain its bargain fares and still make a profit-at a time
when the scheduled airlines were charging much higher fares but
wasting half their product; that is, by flying with only about 55 p~rcent of the seats actually occupied. At that time, moreover, the airlines were still receiving federal subsidies, in addition to air mail
payments , which cushioned their losses.
The curious paradox was that the C.A .B . was party to a sub- sidy to the privileged air travelers, most of them businessmen and
the wealthy, who could afford to fly. Those in the lower-income
groups, on the other hand, seemed well pleased with North American's style and began to patronize the new service. Because of the
tight scheduling and the limited capacity, customers could not al ways be accommodated on the days they preferred to fly, but at
$99.00 from the West Coast to New York, they did not mind waiting a day or two. The alternative was to pay $159 .00 standard fare
by the scheduled airlines, or $110.00 by their night coach-the
Red-Eye Specials as they became known.
_
North American could guarantee that its aircraft were mamtained and flown as skillfully and professionally as those of its
richer rivals. Indeed, throughout the history of the bitter litigation
that was to follow, no criticism. was ever leveled at North American
on the grounds of poor maintenance or operating procedures or of
not keeping to the strictest safety standards . Nevertheless, this did
not prevent the appearance of certain scurrilous articles in the
press, possibly influenced by the weight of Establishment pressure.
Stan Weiss and his partners were so successful that they had

to obtain larger aircraft. By the mid 1950s, North American was a
predominantly four-engined airline. Later, in 1955, Weiss established rewarding business relations with Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, of World War I fame, then the feisty president of Eastern
Air Lines, to ptirchase the entire fleet of DC-4s owned by Eastern.
Rickenbacker, a businessman through and through, insisted that if
Weiss purchased the aircraft, he would also have to buy $1 million
worth of spare parts. Weiss agreed, figuring that the full value of
the fl eet far exceeded whatever the spares would cost.
No sooner had the deal been signed when Eastern realized
that it needed some of the DC-4s back because of late delivery of
the replacement aircraft. It therefore needed the spare parts back
as well, and, to the accompaniment of much profanity, Rickenbacker had to purchase back the exact same spare parts that he
had just unloaded. Much to Rickenbacker's surprise, Weiss sold the
spare parts back for exactly what he had paid for them, saying "I
didn't need them in the first place and was happy with the deal as
it stood."
Rickenbacker never forgot Weiss's business acumen or his
honesty. Many years later he offered Weiss the opportunity to succeed him as president of Eastern Air Lines. Weiss did not elect to ac cept this most flattering offer because of conflicting demands on
his time and energy. But to imagine Eastern under the direction of
Stan Weiss makes an interesting speculation.
As the four-engined DC-4s were added, North American disposed of its DC-3s. Two of these were sold in 1951 to Ken Friedkin,
who had founded Friedkin Aeronautics, which became Pacific
Southwest Airlines (P.S.A.). This later developed into the famous
California intrastate airline that proved, in a different operating environment, that low fares could still yield profits if the airline was
operated efficiently . Weiss sold the DC-3s for $90,000 each on a
handshake. Shortly thereafter, the Korean War started and the
market price for the DC-3s shot up to $400,000 each. Friedkin b ecame worried about the validity of a contract based on a handshake and was mightily relieved when Stan Weiss never wavered
from their oral agreement, delivering the aircraft as and when
promised.
Turning from matters of equipment to matters of public policy
and concern, the period from about 1949, when North American introduced its first DC-4, until its eventual demise was stormy, to put
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it mildly. In 1949 , faced wi th wh a t they beli ~ved to be a determined
effor t by the C.A .B . to e l imioa te them en ti rely from the air tran sport
field, the nonscheduled carrier s appealed for justice, an d heanngs
were held before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee under the chairma nsh ip of Senator Edw in Johnson. Thi s led
to a fu;th er review by the Select Committee on Small Bu siness, under the chairmanship of Senator John Sparkman.
In its r eport issued o n July 10, 1951 , the comm ittee noted that
the nonskeds had managed to s urvive "in spite of constant h ar_assment: th e C.A.B.'s ever-narrowin g interpreta tion of its r egulat10ns
designed to limit them almost entirely to noncommon carrier_ operation s; vigorou s enforcement activities a nd regulat_ory act10 ns
whi ch w ill, if un checked, inevitably eliminate them w1thm a ye~r
or two; a nd a cam p aign possibly inspired by major airlines to discredit them in the public mind."
__
S uch testimony, from such an impeccable source, hushed cnt1cism, and the C.A .B. retreated in to its shell for a while. Tempora_ril y unleash ed, North American Airlines did so well th at_, m 1953, lll
the famo us Denver Service Case-the statutory machmery under
which the C.A.B. d istrib uted sch eduled airspace-it applied to operate a Los Angeles-Denver-Kansas City-Chicago route at threecents a mile plus $2.00 a ticket. This wou ld h ave worked out to less
than $60.00 one way from Los An geles to Chicago . When the C.A.B.
decision was h anded down, a ll the big transcontrnental a1 rl10es
we re granted ad itional routes, and both Con tinent_a l Airlines and
Wes tern Air Lines were given a share of this lu crative pie. But the
board found th at North American was "unfit, unwilling'. an~ unab le" to perform the services, because of "knowing a:1-d w il ful' v10lations of the board's Economic Regulat io ns . This is p articul arly
noteworth y , for by this time North Ameri ca n h a_d surpa ssed some
of the principal trun k airl ines in size, measured lll annu a l revenue
p assen ger-mil es flown.
_
The deci sion cau sed controversy among the nonsch eduled airlin es and, indeed, among many sections of an interested public as
well. North Ameri can Airlines h ad proved beyond any shadow of
doubt that it was fit, w illin g , and able to operate. It was a lso pre p ared to do so with its own money, without su bsidy or support of
any kind . And it offered to lower its fares so that many more people
could afford to fl y . In retrospect, the C.A .B.'s decision seems to
have been ex traordinary.
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The reason for such violations seemed to be more that the
C.A.B. h ad been affronted by someone expos in g an injust ice, even
possi bly a n infringement of its own mandate. The terms of th e origina l Civil Aeronautics Act did not specifically preclude the en try of
addi tion a l airlines into the U.S. airline indus try. Ye t by mutual
agreement, the C.A.B., with vigorou s supp ort from th e Air Transport Association, r epresenting the certificated a irlines, and tacit approval from other government departments, appear ed to fo ll ow an
unwritten law that the only organiza tions· which could opera te a irlines were those nominated in 1938 under the grandfath er rights
ce rtifica tes. Many years later, the Freedom of Entry iss ue was to be
a cornerstone of the principles that shaped the Airline Deregul ation Act of 1978 .
Nevertheless, North American continu ed to opera te und er its
ingenious sys tem . It ch eekily applied for further route exten sions
under existing rules , thus ad din g to the growing confusion in the
C.A.B., which must h ave been conscious of the qu estion of ethi cs,
when the Select Committee.on Small Business in the Senate recommended that the 3 and 8 rule be changed to one permitting fourteen flights a month.
There now seem ed to be no stopping North American . In 1954 ,
with a fle e t of two DC-3s an d seven DC-4s, it flew a lm ost 330 milli on
passenger- miles, carrying a lmost 200,000 passengers. The passenger-mi le figure '--;'as larger tha n that of a ny of the three smallest domestic trunk a irlines-Western, Continenta l, an d Northeas t-owing entirely to the $99.00 fare . Profits were realized because North
American was abl e to fill 85 percent of its sea ts, an unpreceden ted
percentage in the stereotyped world of the sch ed ul ed carrier s .
In December 1954, North American took the plunge and ordered seve n new Douglas DC-6B pressurized a ircraft, each fi tted
with 102 seats, so as to compe te on equa l terms with the big airlines. Once aga in, a loan was obtained from th e Bank of America
which must h ave felt that in Stan Weiss it was inves ting we ll. Th:
m arketi n g department a t Douglas was in a quand a ry, for it was under pressure from certain q uarters not to sell airp lanes to this upstart airline . Donald Douglas, Sr., gave strict ins truc tion s: "If S ta n
Weiss has th e money , you sell him the airpl anes ."
On May 1, 1955, to the_con sterna tion of United, T.W.A ., and
American, North American Air lines ina u gura ted DC-6B transco ntinental service, ch arging $160.00 round tri p as b efore, but reducing
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the one-way fare to $88.00. Flight times were 7 hours 55 minutes
eastbound, and 8 hours 55 minutes westbound. North American utilized its aircraft at the rate of thirteen fl yin g hours a day, whereas
th e sche dule d airlines felt they w er e doing well to achieve eight . At
the time , this was a daily utili zation r ecord for any airline operatin g with Douglas e quipment .
North American's literature contained an interes tin g comparison of travel costs coast to coast, ta kin g into account the ex tra costs
of tax on th e tickets, the cost of food and tips, and the cost of time
at $10.00 a day. This m a de a valid argument to support the claim
tha t it provided sub stantial savin gs over first-class air fares and
pullman tra ins and also offered comfortable savin gs over air
coach, rail coach, and even bus travel.
The scheduled airlines were forced to take drastic step s, and
th e three transcontinenta l airlines suddenly found ways and
m eans to reduce fares. Their excursion p ackages, however, contained cer tain irritating r es trictions, in that they were valid for
only thirty days a nd c ould b e u sed only on certain flight s. (Exactly
th e sa m e situation arose a lmost thirty years la ter when, after deregulation, Continental Airlines se t new lower fares, on a n unrestricted basis, aga inst those of its competitors, which were complicated by various kinds of ifs a nd buts .)
Within two months, the C.A.B. cam e to the rescue of the desp era te airlines, which visualized the erosion of their cherished heritage.
On July 1, 1955 , the board r evoked N .A.A.'s varioti.s certificates for
what it called " serious and wilful violations" of the economic regulati o ns an d ordered Stan Weiss a nd hi s partners in effrontery to cease
"unl awful operations" from September 1 of that year. The schedul ed
airlines, of course, a pplauded thi s action, and R. A. Fitzgerald, of Nation a l Airlines, expressed the consen su s by describing N.A.A. as "professional violators."
In m akin g its judgm ent, the C.A.B. appears to have forgo tten-or delibera tely ignored--one of the most importa nt goa ls of
the act of 1938, which was to promote a ir trave l. It could h ave met
the new si tu ation by other m ea ns. It cou ld have incr eased p ay ments to the sch eduled airlines, for exa mpl e, if it could h ave b een
proved tha t their operatio ns were efficient yet unprofitab le, or it
could h ave re lieved the scheduled airl ines from h av in g to opera te
unprofitable routes, a course which it adopted with respect to Local Service operation s some years la ter. The C.A.B. seem ed, in fact,
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by c hoosing the most drastic course, to b e advocating the cause of
those it was only supposed to regulate. Indeed , a m emb er of th e
board , Joseph P. Adams, in a minority op inion, condemned the majority for refusing even to meet the carrier's (N .A .A.' s) officers or to
consider some penalty other than the most dras ti c, the revocation
of its Le tter of Registration.
The legal battl e intensified. On July 29, the C.A.B. stayed its revocation of the N.A.A . Ii cense, pendi n g review by a U.S. Court of Appeals . Meanwhile, the unrepentant a irline reported a ga in in traffic
for the month of June of 47 percent over traffic in June of the previous year. On August 24, N .A.A. forma lly appealed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals, D .C. Circuit, to s tay the cease-a nd-desis t portion of th e
C.A.B. order and revea led its position when James Fischgrund
stated a t th e hearing that N .A.A. would be forced to di sband if the
stay was not granted. On September 5, the C.A .B . denied North
American's application to enter the New York-Chicago market, although, by any criterion, there see m ed to be plenty of room for another competitor on thi s much -trave led segment . On October 4, the
U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circui t, upheld North American Aviation's cla im that North American Airlines should not be a ll owed to
tra de under a name that was almost indis tingui sh ab le from the
m a nufa c turer's .
Throwing caution to the w inds, and with some jus tifica ti on,
believing tha t the weight of public opinion, r efl ected through its
legislators, would eventually see that justice was done, North
America n played another card. On December 8, 1955, it asked the
C.A.B. for a three-year exemption to operate ]ow-cost transatlantic
coach services, proposing two dai ly round-trip services at fares of
$125.00 from New York to Shannon, Ireland, and $140.00 to London. These were 43 percent less than the tourist fares then in force.
In its application, N.A.A . stated that DC-6Bs would be used
and quo ted its U.S. tran scontinenta l experience . There could be absolutely no doubt that it was "fit, willing, and able." As to the legality, it admitted that its operating authority had been r evoked but
tha t it was appealing to th e cou r ts a nd was continuin g to op era te
until a final d ecision was handed down. The C.A.B. could hardl y
claim that there was insufficient traffic to justify anoth er U.S . operator, a lthough admitting another operator may h ave led to some
problems with bilateral traffic rights with the countri es of E urope.
The North Atlantic market was booming, for even the schedul e of

94

Stanley D. Weiss

tourist fares, introduced in 1952 and 43 percent higher than that
proposed by N.A.A., had sounded the death knell for transatl_an_tic
passenger shipping. Years later, after passage of the 1978 Air_lme
Deregulation Act-and even earlier-the number of U.S. airlines
plying th e route had multiplied considerably , with a lmost every
trunk airline participating .
But predictably, in January 1956-within a month after its
submission-the C.A.B. turned down North American's application on the grounds that the issues were too complex to be decided
by the exemption process. This, in retrospect, was an extr~ordinary claim, for many complex issues and extremely complicated
route cases were continually resolved by the hard-working staff of
the C.A .B. The board also stated that "a very serious question remains unresolved" as to N .A.A.'s qualifications, in view of the fact
that the airline h a d been found guilty of violations and its operating authority had been revoked. Stan Weiss and hi s partners had
heard th a t old tun e before .
This was far from being a case of protecting the unsuspecting
public against some entrepreneur who was trying to make a quick
buck. Stan Weiss had a genuine desire to become a leg1t1mate
sch eduled operator, accepting the risks and the obligations which . . .
that status would confer. As to the public interes t, a virtue so often
quoted by the C.A.B. in other contexts, the public ha~ given its
blessing to North American Airlines. In 1955 N.A.A. earned alri:10st
275,000 passen ger s, an increase of 40 percent over the previous
year. Its fle e t consisted of seven DC-4s and two DC-6Bs, and five
more of the latter were on order.
In 195 5 North American had made about $ 1 million profit on
$ 15 milli on revenue, a better return on inves tment tha~ wa~ realized by most of th e certificated airlines. Yet North Amencan s su,ccess had been built on sub sta ntially lower fares than the C.A.B. s,
a nd there was a clear message implicit in these fact s, which was obvious to all but closed minds. As North American stressed, its cliente le consisted almost entirely of firs t-time air trav elers, and it was
drawin g traffic, not from other airlines, but from the bus lines and
the railroad s .
In February 1956, wh en N.A.A . was gambling on its future exis tence and still awaiting delivery of addit,ional new D~-6Bs from
Douglas, the chairman of the House Commerce Transportat_ion
Sub-Committee commented that h e was "impressed by the obJec-

tives, but not with the methods" of North American, which, on
March 12, said it was prepared to back up charges that the C.A .B.
had been" a willing party to a callous, calculated conspiracy" to ostraci ze new trunk-line carriers. Stan Weiss ca refully pointed out
that his charges were nonpolitical, a imed a t Rep ublican a nd Democrat a like, and that both had hatched their conspiracy under "constant prodding and behind-the-scenes pressures " from "monopolyminded trunk airlines."
He claimed that "the C.A.B . has sought to regulate us out of
business" and that "the more the public w elcomed and accepted
our original concept of efficient, reliabl e, low -cos t air transportation , the greater were the regulatory handicaps imposed upon our
growth ." He told the subcommittee that C.A.B. Chairman Ross
Rizl ey had admitted that th e board approved r a tes and other "monopoly agreements " made b y the scheduled airlines and that it h ad
"no standard yardstick" for measuring these a greements . Furthermore , it did not regul arly consult with the Justice Department on
the an titrus t aspects of th e agreement. We iss's counsel, Hard y
Maclay, observed that the efforts of the C.A.B. to increase co mpe tition had never been responsible for lower rates and th a t, as the
chairman of the subcommittee recognized, su ch competition had
been limited to service facto r s.
While the public was cl amoring for lower fares-wh ich North
American Airlines h ad d emonstrated were perfec tly feasible-the
C.A .B. would argue interminably about a minor modifi ca tion to a
multisegment route, or the sea t pitch allowed, or the s tandard of
meal service permitted, wading through enormous stacks of tes ti mony in the process. Reminiscent of debate by the Internationa l
Air Transport Association (IATA) on the permi ss ible in gredi en ts of
a sandwich, the prognostications of the C.A .B. were often reminiscent of the mediaeval philosophers' arguments about the numb er
of angels th at could dance on the head of a pin .
The C.A.B. also a lleged tha t in internationa l route decision s it
had to capitulate to IATA rate agreements beca u se of "tremendous
pr~ssures from, our own carriers a nd foreign a irlines a nd governmen ts. " IATA was q u ite blatantly a cartel, set tin g air fares at rates
deci ded by the member a irlines , including the fl ag carriers of the
United States . North American countered thi s excu se by applying,
on April 30, 1956, for exe mption to fl y to Lu xem bourg, a sm a ll
country in E urop e whose air p olicy did not include IATA m ember-
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ship, which welcomed foreign airlines, and which was geographically situated to tap the entire northwest European market. In fact,
the Icelandic airline, the pioneer of low fares across the North Atlantic, has successfully used the Luxembourg hub-gateway for
more than two decades in recent times.
Both the C.A.B. and the U.S. State Department criticized
North American for conducting unilateral negotiations . This
seemed to have been a bizarre commentary, as there were many
precedents for airlines to open discussions without prior consultation with Washington. Of course, by these protracted wranglings
the issue of low fares was continually obscured and evaded.
The harassment of North American continued. Also on April
30, the Supreme Court denied the petition of North American to reverse the lower court's decision on the name issue, and N.A.A.
promptly changed its name, on May 12, 1956, to Trans American
Airlines (T.A.A.). Shortly thereafter, on July 12, the use of the word
American was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals. For any one
company to claim exclusive ly for the use of that evocative word
would have been preposterous.
On June 11, Trans American amended its still-pending application for exemption. It offered to discontinue its proposed service ~
if the C.A .B. could find that any competitor was injured thereby.
Furthermore, it agreed to charge "such rates as the Board found
proper." This put the C.A.B. in an extremely delicate position. To
quote Stan Weiss, "How could they say that we should charge more
when we were making money on what we were doing?"
But the sands were running out. Casting logic aside, the
C.A.B. rejected T.A.A.'s app lication on July 29, and its Office of
Compliance opened enforcement proceedings . In December 1956,
the U .S . Court of Appeals upheld the C.A.B. order to ground Stan
Weiss and his recalcitrant and unrepentant airline. After repeated
stays of execution, through the T.A.A. lawyers' use of every possible
legal maneuver, amounting almost to a filibuster, the last of the
Large Irregular Carriers closed up shop on January 19, 1957, the
last day of the term of the C.A.B.'s authorizatio,n.
In one last desperate appeal for justice, on March 12, 1957,
Trans American Airlines asked the Supreme Court to review the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals to uphold the C.A.B.'s revocation
action against it. On April 23 of the same year the Supreme Court
denied the appeal.
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North American/Trans American was finished. Because, under the law, the decision of the Supreme Court left it only forty-five
days to liquidate its assets, it leased its fleet of seven DC-6Bs to
Eastern Air Lines (five were already on hand, and two more were
about to be delivered). By this action, the four partners, Weiss,
Fischgrund, Lewin, and Hart, all made a great deal of money over
and above their earnings while the airline was operating.
The sighs of relief in Washington, particularly at the headquarters of the Air Transport Association and at the C.A.B., cou ld
have been heard in Baltimore . But the issues remained and were to
haunt the regulatory body and the trade association for decades to
follow . Were the regulations adopted without fair hearings? Were
the regulations deliberately framed so as to make nonscheduled airline operations impossible? Was the public interest protected? By
subsequent legislation, through the gradual liberalization of what
became the Supplemental Airlines and culminating in the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, the answers to these fundamental questions·have come down emphatically on the side of Stan Weiss and
his partners . The influence of the A.T.A. on the course of airline affairs has diminished almost to insignificance, and the airlines are
no longer subject to the whims of the Gang of Five who used to preside at the C.A.B.
Unlike some of the visionaries of airline progress whose efforts ended in complete failure and disillusionment, not to mention
financial hardship, Stanley Weiss was not a man to cry over spilt
milk. He didn't need to. During the ascendancy of North American
Airlines he and his partners had been in the 90 percent tax bracket,
all earned, in the real sense of that often misused word, by bringing
the benefits of air travel to a public that had been deprived of
them. And so, denied the right to operate aircraft, he turned to an
occupation that bad until then only been a supplementary activity:
he went into the business of trading and leasing aircraft.
As Twentieth Century Aircraft, Stan Weiss bought, sold, and
leased many aircraft during the late 1950s and in to the 1970s. Having first taken advantage during the mid 1950s of a law that did not
allow banks to go into leasing, Weiss and other associates bought
Super Constellations from Lockheed and leased them to Seaboard
World Airlines, then one of the largest air freight airlines in the
world. Additionally, through other associated leasing companies in
New York, be and his partners completed what is believed to have
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been the firs t sale-leaseback of airline equipment in the hi story of
a ir transport, th e aforementioned DC-4 deal.
Between 1958 and 1960, Twentieth Century Airlines, like a determin ed terrier that would not let go of the bulldog, fu lfilled its
destiny as a contract carrier on assignments th a t were free of
C.A.B ., A.T.A., or other encroachment. It carried military personne l
a ll over the world, with DC-6Bs purchased from American Airlines
and the Dutch airline, K.L.M ., to gether with Super Constellations
purchased fro m Lockheed and th e Au stralian a irline , QANTAS . In
a wave of mi splaced optimism, it petition ed for a Supplementary
Certificate when Public Law 87-528, ena cted July 10, 1962, conferred the status of legitimacy on thos e airlines that had until then
been the pariahs and outcasts of the industry. But Stan Weiss was
persona non gra ta in the corridors of airline p ower in Washington,
and hi s was a lost cause.
Stan Weiss's semiretirement began at the age of forty-seven,
as a direct result of the cease-and-desist order issued against his a irline. The order might well have bee n termed a cease-and-desist order against the American public for havin g the effrontery to recogni ze a real bargai n when they saw one. Eventually the public,
through its legislators, r ebelled. The C.A.B . was itself destroyed ,
mourned by some but certain ly not by the old-timers of the no nschedul ed airlines, who were, without stretchin g the analogy too
far, martyrs to a cause.
Stan now li ves qu ie tl y at home in Long Beach. In the m a ter ia l
sense h e is comfortable, with many investments and considerable
assets . He h as r emained ac tive in aviat ion and in his p ersona l leisure pursuits, among which is serving as voluntary consultant to a
host of friends. Many would n ever have recovered from the understandable di sillusionment and di sench a ntment , together with the
complex em otions generated by the loss of the airline of which its
creator was justly proud. But he did not brood over the inju's ti ce
th at he felt h a d been enacted through manipulation in high places.
Neither did he a llow the C.A.B. 's implication that what he h a d
done was dishonorable to interfere with his unending love affair
with aviation. This continued in his a ctive life as broker, investor,
a nd financier and in recreational a nd business fl ying well into the
1970s.
All the acti vity th at was self-r ighteously regarded as das tardly practice in the 1950s is now perfectly lega l, an d no one

would drea m of questionin g it. Stan Weiss had h a d to live with a
sense of injustice for thirty years. But by an odd twist of fate, Twentieth Century Aircraft, legi timate descendant of a mu ch-mali g ned
Irregular Carrier, still exists. The sun had, however, irrevocably set
on the Civil Aeronautics Board, which ceased to exist o n December
31, 1984 .
.
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